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ABSTRACT
This Essay addresses recent research and commentary regarding the
potential contributions of cognitive neuroscience to law. For the first
time, cognitive neuroscience methods have been brought to bear on the
Model Penal Code’s (MPC’s) culpable–mental state categories through
a neuroimaging study seeking to identify the neural correlates of
knowledge and recklessness. Subsequently, this study has been
presented as a paradigm for utilizing cognitive neuroscience to answer
important legal questions. However, the original experiment appears to
suffer serious experimental-design and conceptual limitations, belying
subsequent advocacy for the legal utility of cognitive neuroscience. This
Essay methodically details these limitations and argues that the original
study does not seem to have actually elicited knowledge or recklessness
in subjects or, even if it did, did not elicit them in discrete enough
fashion to permit identification of the mental states’ neural correlates.
The Essay also contends, more broadly, that cognitive neuroscience
appears inapt for investigating the propriety of the MPC’s mens rea
delineations since these are articulated in purely psychologicalbehavioral terms: mental states are the only requisites. Only
psychological-behavioral manifestations provide base evidence of
mental states’ existences. And psychological-behavioral research, not
cognitive neuroscience, is the most direct way to investigate the
practical, moral, and legal appropriateness of the MPC’s mental states
by illuminating how individuals experience them, identify them in
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others, or employ them to dispense blame and punishment. Ultimately,
recent cognitive neuroscience research does not appear to reveal
anything of legal significance regarding the MPC. And, more broadly
and contrary to recent assertions, cognitive neuroscience has
substantial limitations when it comes to producing legally relevant
information. Going forward, psychological-behavioral research
should be given primacy in cognitive science investigations of MPC
concepts. Cognitive neuroscience studies, on the other hand, should be
treated with exceptional skepticism.
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INTRODUCTION
As the Model Penal Code (MPC) approaches its sixth decennial,
the legal innovations it embodies continue to reverberate through
criminal law doctrine and scholarship alike. 1 And perhaps no
contribution is as substantial as the MPC’s authors recognizing four
culpable mental states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. 2 Given the prominence and influence of this delineation,

1. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 1–7 (2nd
ed., 2015) (remarking on the continued, expansive, and unparalleled influence of the MPC on
criminal law); Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 340 (2007) (“For almost half a century, the [MPC] has been
the dominant force in American criminal code reform and a catalyst for American criminal law
scholarship.”).
2. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2); see Luis E. Chiesa, Mens Rea in Comparative
Perspective, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 579 (2018) (“The most influential provision of the MPC is
[the] section . . . defin[ing] subjective offense elements,” which defines culpable mental states);
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its frequent evaluation and critique over decades is unsurprising. 3 But
despite this extensive engagement, there remain avenues of study that
are relatively unworn or, indeed, entirely untraversed. One such
avenue is a methodology employed by a team led by psychologist Iris
Vilares (Vilares and colleagues) for the first time roughly 55 years after
the MPC’s official release: cognitive neuroscience utilizing functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 4
Cognitive neuroscience is the study of how the brain gives rise to
the mind. 5 For its part, fMRI, along with attendant technology and
methods, is a powerful tool for studying brain function and, pertinently,
identifying the neural correlates of cognitive activity. 6 Put simply,
fMRI indirectly and non-invasively measures brain function by
indirectly measuring blood flow: neuronal activity is correlated with a
delayed influx of oxygenated blood—e.g., as neuronal activity in a
brain region increases, the amount of oxygenated blood in that region
increases as well—and fMRI measures a signal (the blood oxygen
level–dependent (BOLD) signal) correlated with the amount of
Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 335 (“[T]he [MPC]’s definitions of these four mental states
may be the code’s most important contribution to American criminal law reform.”). “Mental
state” is a contested psychological concept, though it is generally used to describe states of
thinking and feeling. E.J. LOWE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 39 (2000). A
notable, though certainly not controlling, recent definition of mental state is the following:
A transient cognitive or emotional state of the organism that can be described in terms
of its contents (what the state is ‘about’) and the relation that the subject bears to the
contents (for example, perceiving, believing, fearing, imagining or remembering).
Kalina Christoff, Zachary C. Irving, Kieran C.R. Fox, R. Nathan Spreng & Jessica R. AndrewsHanna, Mind Wandering as Spontaneous Thought: A Dynamic Framework, 17 NATURE REV. 718,
719 (2016). In the MPC, relevant mental states are defined in terms of the intentionality or
awareness, or lack thereof, that they manifest towards the elements of delineated criminal
offenses. Paul H. Robinson, Mens Rea, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 995, 998–1001
(Joshua Dressler ed., 2nd ed., 2002); see infra note 44 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 55–88 and accompanying text.
4. Iris Vilares, Michael J. Wesley, Woo-Young Ahn, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris Hoffman,
Owen D. Jones, Stephen J. Morse, Gideon Yaffe, Terry Lohrenz & P. Read Montague, Predicting
the Knowledge-Recklessness Distinction in the Human Brain, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 3222 (2017).
5. STEPHEN M. KOSSLYN & OLIVIER KOENIG, WET MIND: THE NEW COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 3–4 (1992); see generally Michael I. Posner & Gregory J. DiGirolamo, Cognitive
Neuroscience: Origins and Promise, 126 PSYCH. BULL. 873 (2000) (describing the field of cognitive
neuroscience and its history). Cognitive neuroscientists “typically start with the assumption that
the [physicalist] view of the mind . . . is correct (that the mind is a product of the brain), and then
try to understand how the brain makes the mind possible.” JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF:
HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 18 (2002).
6. See PETER A. BANDETTINI, FMRI 23–50 (2020) (presenting fMRI technology and
techniques and their history). fMRI is considered “the preeminent method of functional
neuroimaging.” Geoffrey K. Aguirre, Functional Neuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and Social
Perspectives, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S8, S8 (2014).
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oxygenated blood in brain regions over time. 7 Researchers can discern
brain regions that are relatively more or less active during a cognitive
task by comparing the BOLD signal in the regions during the target
task to that during alternative tasks or baseline states—i.e., by
analyzing the BOLD contrast. 8
Vilares and colleagues employ cognitive neuroscience and fMRI
in an attempt to build on a body of psychological-behavioral
research—i.e., research examining mental states and behavior through
subjects’ behavioral responses to tasks—investigating the legitimacy of
the MPC’s culpable mental states. 9 Authors of the studies comprising
this body of literature largely interpret their findings as suggesting that
individuals have difficulty recognizing and discriminating between the
MPC’s knowing and reckless mental states and, contrary to the MPC’s
directives, do not consistently punish those who exhibited knowledge
during an offensive act more than those who exhibited recklessness. 10
These results potentially challenge the propriety of knowledge and
recklessness as separate culpability determinants and, perhaps, their
existences as distinct mental states. 11 Vilares and colleagues seek to
address these two issues by attempting to ascertain whether knowledge
and recklessness entail different brain activity. 12
In a recent essay, Detecting Mens Rea in the Brain, a team led by
legal scholar Owen Jones (Jones and colleagues) expounds upon and
7. Id. at S9–S10; BANDETTINI, supra note 6, at 26–29. According to psychiatrist Sally Satel
and psychologist Scott Lilienfeld,
[fMRI] leverages the fact that everything the brain enables us to do—feel, think,
perceive, and act—is linked, or correlated, with changes in oxygen consumption and
regional blood flow in the brain. When a person responds to a task, . . . specific regions
of the brain are typically engaged and receive more oxygen-laden, or oxygenized,
blood. The increased blood flow and the boost in oxygen associated with it are proxies
for increased activation of neurons.
SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED: THE SEDUCTIVE APPEAL OF MINDLESS
NEUROSCIENCE 5 (2013). For an in-depth assessment of fMRI, see generally Richard B. Buxton,
The Physics of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), 76 REP. PROGRESS
PHYSICS 1 (2013).
8. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neural
Imaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1139–
40 (2010); see Adina L. Roskies, Brain Imaging Techniques, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW
AND NEUROSCIENCE 61 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013) (“Almost all
neuroimaging experiments are interested in comparing data between different task conditions.”).
9. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3222–23.
10. See infra notes 57–88 and accompanying text. Being determined to have been knowing
rather than reckless can often have dramatic implications for defendants in terms of potential and
actual punishment. Owen D. Jones, Read Montague & Gideon Yaffe, Detecting Mens Rea in the
Brain, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2021).
11. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
12. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3222–23, 3227.
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extols the aforementioned study, of which they are coauthors. 13 They
posit that Vilares and colleagues discerned distinct physical
underpinnings of knowledge and recklessness and that this provides
scientific support for these classifications being actual, separate
psychological states and, therefore, appropriate determinants of legal
culpability. 14 They also contend that “the moral legitimacy of the
[MPC]’s taxonomy of culpable mental states—which punishes those in
defined mental states differently—depends on whether those mental
states actually correspond to different brain states in the way the
[MPC] categorization assumes.” 15 That is, specific cognitive
neuroscience experimental results are allegedly not only relevant to
but also necessary for legitimizing the Code’s mental state categories.
However, due to experimental-design and conceptual issues with
Vilares and colleagues’ study, the assertions of Jones and colleagues
appear inadequately supported. 16
This Essay comprehensively evaluates the study by Vilares and
colleagues and the claims of Jones and colleagues. It ultimately
resolves that the study was not properly designed so as to elicit
knowledge or recklessness or, even if it did, it did not measure these
mental states’ neural correlates. In addition, cognitive neuroscience is
shown to be an inapt approach to investigating the existence or
legitimacy of the MPC’s culpable mental states, which are
psychological-behavioral concepts and, as such, can only be
fundamentally validated using psychological-behavioral research
methods. Thus, contrary to the assertions of Jones and colleagues, the
study by Vilares and colleagues does not appear to be a paradigm of
legally-relevant cognitive neuroscience research. In fact, it is
questionable whether the study produced any findings of legal
significance.
To be clear, this Essay does not stand against cognitive
neuroscience potentially producing legally relevant findings. But the
use of and expectations for these methods must be appropriately
tempered. Going forward, researchers seeking to investigate the reality
and propriety of the Code’s mens rea categories via cognitive science
should proceed cautiously and in an actionable progression. Any one
13. Jones et al., supra note 10.
14. Id. at 21–22.
15. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
16. Vilares and colleagues also make suspect contentions. See Vilares et al., supra note 4, at
3225–27. While their article is not the main target of this Essay, Vilares and colleagues’
questionable predications are largely reiterated and elaborated on by Jones and colleagues and
are therefore substantially addressed here.
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experiment will likely contribute relatively little of practical, moral, or
legal significance unless the following are ordinally obtained: (1) clear,
reliable, and valid methods for inducing and quantifying mental states;
(2) equally lucid mappings between mental states and the MPC; and
(3) reliable and valid neural tests that are sensitive and specific to
distinctions between mental states. Given that (1) is broadly lacking,
efforts should be invested there until sufficient consensus has been
reached with regard to these methods, and cognitive neuroscience
studies should be treated with exceptional skepticism.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I provides relevant
context to Vilares and colleagues’ study and Jones and colleagues’
claims. It concisely articulates the history of the MPC’s mental state
categories, their influence on criminal law, and the current body of
empirical psychological-behavioral research examining this section of
the MPC. In so doing, this part illuminates how the MPC’s culpability
criteria were conceived of in non-scientific, psychological-behavioral
terms and entail purely psychological-behavioral requisites. As a
result, psychological-behavioral research, not neuroscience, has thus
far advanced legally relevant understandings of the MPC and the
knowing and reckless categories in particular. Part II outlines the
experiment conducted by Vilares and colleagues. The cognitive
neuroscience methods and results are presented in detail so as to
facilitate robust engagement. This part concludes with the study’s
alleged implications as put forth by Jones and colleagues. Part III
presents our full critique of the study by Vilares and colleagues and the
claims of Jones and colleagues. First, interpretive limitations of the
experiment are described that cabin the explanatory power of Vilares
and colleagues’ study but do not significantly challenge Jones and
colleagues’ assertions. These limitations comprise the timing of the
neuroimaging conducted by Vilares and colleagues and the nature of
recklessness as articulated in the MPC. Second, experimental-design
limitations are detailed that conceivably undercut Jones and
colleagues’ claim that the experiment discerned disparate neural
functioning correlated with knowledge or recklessness. This part posits
that the experiment seems improperly designed to evoke knowledge or
recklessness. 17 And even if the target mental states were elicited,
subjects likely did not experience knowledge and recklessness in a
discrete enough fashion for attendant neural functioning to be credibly
17. Deductions as to the mental states subjects actually experienced are frustrated by
Vilares and colleagues not requiring participants to explicitly register their appreciations of
experimental conditions. See infra notes 144–149 and accompanying text.
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discerned. Finally, broader conceptual limitations are outlined. These
entail the nature of the MPC’s culpable mental states as psychologicalbehavioral concepts whose base actuality can only be discerned via
psychological-behavioral methods. Cognitive neuroscience can only
contribute to investigating the aforementioned mental states once they
have been sufficiently validated by psychological-behavioral research,
which has not yet occurred. By prematurely employing cognitive
neuroscience to verify the MPC’s knowing and reckless culpability
standards, Vilares and colleagues appear to have produced legally
trivial findings.
I. RELEVANT CONTEXT
It is a core tenet of Anglo-American criminal law that “actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his
mind is guilty).” 18 This principle is generally implemented by
formulating crimes as compounds of guilty acts (actus rei) and guilty
minds (mentes reae). 19 And arguably the most influential work with
regard to mentes reae is the MPC, 20 crafted over roughly a decade by
esteemed experts from multiple disciplines and promulgated in 1962.21
To adequately foreground critiques of cognitive neuroscience research
targeting the Code’s knowing and reckless culpable mental states, this
section first briefly expounds upon the origins of the MPC’s four mens
rea categories. It then describes relevant reported findings of the
psychological-behavioral literature addressing these mental states.

18. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636; accord Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens
Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932).
19. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound
concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing
hand, . . . took deep and early root in American soil.”). The most prominent exceptions to this
formulation of crimes are strict liability offenses, which require no mens rea, Thomas Weigend,
Subjective Elements of Criminal Liability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 491
(Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014), and are controversial because of this, see, e.g.,
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY (A.P. Simester ed., 2005) (presenting varied analyses of strict
liability).
20. See, e.g., Markus Dubber, The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code and
European Criminal Law, in SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 210
(André Klip ed., 2011) (“[T]he [MPC] is the closest thing to a conceptual—if not a doctrinal—
backbone of American criminal law.”); Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 958 (1998) (“The [MPC] [is] widely recognized as comprising the
dominant culpability scheme in American criminal law.”).
21. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 323–24; Herbert Wechsler, Codification of
Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1426–27
(1968).
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A. The Origins of the Model Penal Code’s Culpable Mental States
Prior to the MPC, criminal law “was [in] a chaotic state . . . with
regard to the mental elements of offenses.” 22 Widespread but
uncoordinated, desultory court treatments utilized “an abundance of
[ill-defined] terms,” 23 which resulted in “variety, disparity[,] and
confusion” concerning “the requisite but elusive mental element.” 24
The MPC refined “the dozens of mental states that . . . emerged over
the course of the common law” into four that are relatively
punctiliously specified: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and
negligence. 25
Legal scholar Herbert Wechsler, the Chief Reporter and principal
drafter of the MPC, describes demarcating and defining the MPC’s
culpable mental states as “one of the hardest drafting problems in the
framing of the Code,” 26 the resolution of which was profoundly
affected by his deep knowledge and personal understanding of criminal
law. At the start of Wechsler’s work on the MPC, he acknowledged
psychologists’ criticisms of then-contemporary doctrine: namely, that
it employed unsound, superficial, and outmoded psychological
concepts like “deliberation,” “will,” “passion,” and “intent” in
characterizing and categorizing wrongdoers and wrongdoing.27

22. Ronald L. Gainer, The Culpability Provisions of the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 575, 577 (1988).
23. Wechsler, supra note 21, at 1436. Legal scholar Luis Chiesa remarks that
[t]his haphazard approach led courts of various jurisdictions to invoke terms such as
felonious intent, criminal intent, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, fraudulent
intent, willfulness, and scienter, to denote the guilty knowledge, or mens rea, of
criminal offenses. It is unclear what each of these terms mean and how they differ from
each other, if they differ at all.
Chiesa, supra note 2, at 578–79 (citation and internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets
omitted); see Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815 (1980) (estimating that American common law included “nearly eighty
miscellaneous culpability terms”).
24. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
25. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 335; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW
INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining the purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent
mental states); Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions
on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact
Doctrine, 27 SW. U.L. REV. 229, 230 (1997) (“The Code obliterated ill-defined, confusing common
law language and concepts and replaced them with four specifically defined hierarchical levels of
culpability.”).
26. Herbert Wechsler, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Law, in
CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR LEON RADZINOWICZ
435 (Roger Hood ed., 1974).
27. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1103
(1952).
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However, Wechsler was relatively skeptical of the potential for science
to contribute to law. 28 Whereas some eminent scholars advocated
science-first approaches to crafting a model penal code—i.e., first
conducting criminal law–relevant scientific research and allowing any
code to “emerge as a natural product of the various detailed
investigations” 29—Wechsler explicitly rejected such notions and
emphasized the judgment of legal thinkers and existing law in
fashioning doctrine. 30 “[O]nly by systematic study of the penal law and
its pervasive problems,” he writes, “can we [legal experts] appraise the
relevancy of behavior science in this field.”31 And he endorsed folkpsychological, as opposed to technical-psychological, appreciations of
human thought and conduct as being most pertinent to criminal law. 32
That is, he supported delineating criminal law in terms of acts and
mental states described in ordinary, non-scientific language. 33
Though Wechsler acknowledged “pervasive problems” in thenextant penal regimes, he appreciated criminal law’s accumulated
wisdom. 34 This makes one aspect of his approach to jurisprudence
28. See Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture
and Doctrine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691, 812 (2002)
(“Wechsler always harbored a good deal more skepticism of the scientists’ powers than did many
other reformers.”).
29. Jerome Hall, The Proposal to Prepare a Model Penal Code, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 91, 93
(1951).
30. Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1132–33; see Herbert Wechsler, American Criminal Law
Institute: II. A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
524, 530 (1955) (“The legal standard of responsibility is not a proposition in psychiatry. It is a
moral and juristic concept drawn from deep ideas of justice derived from the ancient world.”).
31. Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1132–33. See Wechsler, supra note 30, at 530 (“We must
consider first the ends that law should serve before we can determine how far science bears on
their attainment.”).
32. See Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: I, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 761 n.203 (1937) (responding to a critique that criminal law’s “old analysis
of act and intent can stand only as an artificial legal analysis” by stating that “an analysis of
criminal behavior in terms of act, knowledge, intent, motive and risk is essential for legal
purposes,” and “[i]n so far as such an analysis is psychological, it is not in any respect unsound,”
for while “[i]t does not provide a complete psychology[,] the problem is not solely a psychological
one”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
33. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, MECHANICAL CHOICES: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
HUMAN MACHINE 12–13 (2020) (“The folk psychology . . . is the psychology of rational agency
in terms of which we describe, explain, and evaluate our own and others’ behavior in daily life.”);
MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, at xviii (2013) (“The expression ‘folk psychology’
refers to our common psychological/mental concepts and our ordinary use of words expressing
the[m].”).
34. See Wechsler, supra note 30, at 525–26 (“[W]e inherited a system at the start and here,
as elsewhere, it was more congenial upon the whole to build on that foundation [of prevailing
doctrine] than to start anew.”).
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particularly salient in contemplating the MPC’s culpability criteria: his
emphasis on “procedural particularity and institutional competence
over substantive doctrine.” 35 Legal scholar David Wolitz cogently
argues that, in crafting the MPC, Wechsler did not endeavor to
“remak[e] the law from a blank slate according to any single
overarching normative theory.” 36 Rather, he sought to glean and refine
core values, principles, and purposes from existing regimes in order to
“match means (doctrines) and ends (values) as effectively as possible”
in a concise, coherent form readily implementable, in whole or in part,
by legislatures. 37 And Wechsler viewed the primary purpose of criminal
law as preventing certain harms. 38 To serve this purpose, he supported
deterrence- (both special and general), incapacitation-, and treatmentfocused measures. 39 (He was quite critical of retributivist framings of
criminal law. 40) These aims fundamentally influenced Wechsler’s
consideration of mental states with regard to criminality:

35. David Wolitz, Herbert Wechsler, Legal Process, and the Jurisprudential Roots of the
Model Penal Code, 51 TULSA L. REV. 633, 634 (2016). “Wechsler was one of the leading
exponents of the legal process school that dominated academic law in the 1950s and 1960s,”
Jonathan Simon, Wechsler’s Century and Ours: Reforming Criminal Law in a Time of Shifting
Rationalities of Government, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 247, 247 (2003), which emphasized effective
procedure and institutions over normative considerations. Some consider the MPC “the great
legislative achievement of the ‘legal process’ school of thought in American law.” Harold Edgar,
Herbert Wechsler and the Criminal Law: A Brief Tribute, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1347, 1355 (2000).
For an in-depth treatment of legal process thinking, see generally Charles L. Barzun, The
Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1 (2013).
36. Wolitz, supra note 35, at 634.
37. Id. at 635; see Markus D. Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal
Code, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 76–77 (2000) (“Ever the pragmatic practitioner of Legal Process,
Wechsler viewed penal law as a matter of instrumental policy.”); Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1105
(“The challenge lies in making the social and psychological evaluations of behavior involved in
legislative application of [criminal law] principles upon a practicable scale.”).
38. See Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1105 (“Civilized social thought regards penal law as the
ultimate weapon for diminishing the incidence of major injuries to individuals and institutions . . .
. [W]hile invocation of a penal sanction necessarily depends on past behavior, the object is control
of harmful conduct in the future.”); id. at 1105–06 (remarking that “the first task of analysis [in
crafting a model penal code] is to appraise and classify the major injuries with the prevention of
which penal law should be concerned”); Wechsler & Michael, supra note 32, at 731 (“[T]he
principal end of the law of homicide is the prevention of behavior which may cause death.”).
39. See id. at 733 (“[T]he kinds of behavior to be described [by criminal law] are (1) those
which it is desirable and possible to deter and (2) those which provide sufficient grounds for
believing that the persons behaving in those ways may be dangerous enough in the future to
warrant incapacitating or reforming them.”); accord Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1105.
40. See Herbert Wechsler, Book Review, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 426 (1949) (reviewing
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (1947)) (describing Jerome Hall’s
“throw[ing] aside of preventive theories” of criminal law in favor of a retributive one as “a
regressive major premise”).
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Unless the actor is or ought to be aware of those aspects of his
behavior or of the environment that give his conduct an offensive
quality, the threat of sanctions cannot operate as a deterrent and the
conduct does not show the individual to be a larger menace than
another man [such that state-imposed incapacitation or treatment is
warranted]. Criminality ought not, therefore, to depend upon
external factors; it should also take account of the actor’s state of
mind. 41

Wechsler’s skepticism of the legal import of science,
instrumentalist approach to doctrine, and belief in the core preventive
charge of criminal law help illuminate the nature of the mens rea
categories ultimately demarcated in the MPC. The Code’s drafters, via
published commentary, assert that “the concepts of purpose,
knowledge, recklessness and negligence suffice to delineate the kinds
of culpability that may be called for in the definition of specific
crimes.” 42 On their faces, these concepts evince bases in folkpsychological understandings of human agency and cognitive
capacity. 43 Using this language, the definitions rely on differences in
motive and appreciations of environments and the risks attendant with
conduct in defining culpability tiers—e.g., at the top, purpose entails
specific results being an individual’s “conscious object,” whereas
knowledge involves an individual being “practically certain” that
particular results will follow from his conduct, though these results are
not necessarily sought; next, recklessness comprises conscious
disregard for the “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that one’s conduct
will cause certain results, while negligence encompasses a
condemnable lack of awareness of such risk. 44 The drafters, in turn,
make no reference to psychological concepts or literature in their
comments addressing the four mental states, 45 in contrast to comments
concerning other parts of the Code. 46 The criteria appear wholly
distilled (for easy consumption and implementation by legislatures)
41.
42.

Wechsler, supra note 27, at 1108.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND REVISED
COMMENTS 227 (1985). See Herbert Wechsler, On Culpability and Crime: The Treatment of Mens
Rea in the Model Penal Code, 339 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 27–28 (1962) (“[F]or
purposes of liability only four concepts are needed to describe the kinds of culpability that may
be deemed sufficient and to draw the distinctions that may usefully be drawn.”).
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). For a
brief description of folk psychology, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
45. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at 229–44.
46. See, e.g., id. at 351–64 (citing psychological literature on the cognitive effects of alcohol
ingestion in a consistent manner in relation to the MPC’s treatment of intoxication).
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from criminal law and criminal law scholarship following an expansive
survey and critical analysis, 47 with apparent primary concern for crime
prevention and secondary concern for retributive principals. 48 Thus,
the MPC’s culpable mental states are seemingly folk-psychological
products of a meticulous instrumentalist straining of criminal law
without regard for scientific validity or verifiability.
B. Psychological-Behavioral Research Addressing the Model Penal
Code’s Mens Rea Categories
The MPC had immediate and lasting impact on American criminal
law. Over thirty jurisdictions significantly reformed their criminal
codes within thirty years of the MPC’s official release and incorporated
the Code’s innovations to various extents. 49 With regard to culpable
mental states, a 1997 survey by Professor Dannye Holley found that
“twenty-two states . . . adopted the [MPC]’s scheme” while four others
“emulate[ed] to a limited extent the Code’s culpability concepts [but]
made significant . . . departures.” 50 Beyond criminal code reform,
“[t]housands of court opinions have cited the [MPC] as persuasive
authority for [statutory interpretation] or . . . to formulate criminal law
47. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at 229–44; see Dubber,
supra note 37, at 60 (“[The MPC] was as much a criminal law treatise as it was a criminal law
code.”); Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1098, 1143 (1978) (describing the MPC as “a remarkable tour de force of analytical
precision” in which “[f]our [culpable] mental states were identified and defined”); Herbert L.
Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594 (1963) (“[The MPC’s]
spirit is one of accommodation, . . . the kind of accommodation to existing institutions that results
from the perception that in law one does not write on a clean slate.”).
48. See Wechsler, supra note 21, at 1432, 1435 (articulating the “dominant preventive
purpose of the Code,” which “has important implications in determining the scope of criminality,”
but also noting “the demands of justice with respect to allocating blame and punishment”).
According to legal scholar Sanford Kadish,
[f]or Wechsler and his colleagues, making the law just meant at bottom that the
preventive purpose of the criminal law must be sought within the constraints of the
principle that punishment may not be imposed in the absence of blameworthy conduct
or in disregard of the degree of blameworthiness reflected in the mental state
accompanying conduct.
Kadish, supra note 47, at 1142. The MPC’s drafters do, however, appear to address some critiques
leveled against criminal law from psychology. See Wechsler supra note 27, at 1105. The Code’s
mens rea categories exclude terms psychologists considered unsound or superficial, like “malice
aforethought” and “premeditation,” in favor of “presumably testable phenomena such as
‘conscious object’ or ‘knowledge,’” thereby “reducing (but not eliminating) reliance upon
normative judgments.” Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 335.
49. Holley, supra note 25, at 229; Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 326.
50. Holley, supra note 25, at 236–37. Thus, “[m]ore than half of the states have adopted
mental state provisions modeled on the MPC framework,” Chiesa, supra note 2, at 579, but “not
all of the states have chosen to adhere to the Code’s specific language,” Holley, supra note 25, at
238.
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doctrine.” 51 In the realms of legal education and research, the MPC
“provides the lingua franca of most people who teach criminal law in
the United States” 52 and has “been the intellectual focus of much
American criminal law scholarship since [its] promulgation.” 53
The MPC’s considerable sway across criminal law, and with
respect to culpable mental states in particular, makes its mens rea
categories prime and appropriate subjects of analysis and critique. 54 In
the decades since the MPC’s official release, its mental state
classifications have been consistently engaged, though treatments have
been predominantly conceptual rather than empirical. 55 Empirical
psychological-behavioral studies examining practical understanding
and application of these classifications were finally conducted
beginning in the early 1990s. Relevant research and findings addressing
how lay people identify MPC mental states, rank them according to
culpability, and employ them are briefly presented here. 56
Three works spanning roughly thirteen years comprise what can
be considered the first wave of such studies. A team led by psychologist
and attorney Laurence Severance reported that subjects generally did
not rank the MPC mental states in the same order of culpability as the
Code or allot punishment to individuals possessing these states in legal
scenarios in a manner consistent with the MPC’s mens rea hierarchy. 57
Legal scholar Justin Levinson similarly recounted that subjects largely
51. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 327; see Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal
Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 949 (1999) (“State and federal courts
commonly came to use [the MPC’s] text and commentary as persuasive, if not authoritative, even
in the absence of legislative reform.”).
52. George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 3 (1998)
53. Robinson & Dubber, supra note 1, at 320.
54. Cf. supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal
Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 931 (2000); Kevin Cole, Knowledge and Belief as Criminal Law
Mental States, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441 (2019); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness,
91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597 (2001); Fletcher, supra note 52, at 6–8 (1998); Michaels, supra
note 20; Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?,
1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV.
463 (1992); see also Gainer, supra note 22, at 581–84 (listing several earlier conceptual critiques
of the MPC mens rea categories).
56. This section does not critically assess the psychological-behavioral studies presented.
Such an endeavor would, however, be an important avenue for future research.
57. Laurence J. Severance, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Inferring the Criminal
Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological Understanding, 20 J. CRIM.
JUST. 107, 115 (1992). These errors occurred across three different subject groups: one where
simply the names of the four MPC mentes reae were provided, one where the names were
provided and subjects had to fill in definitions themselves, and one where the names and legal
definitions were provided. Id. at 109–10, 115.
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did not assign culpability in accordance with the Code when they
assessed identical conduct and harm emanating from people with
different MPC mental states (purpose, knowledge, and recklessness). 58
However, legal scholar Paul Robinson and psychologist John Darley
reported that subjects tended to dispense liability and punishment in
line with the MPC’s hierarchy of mental states when assessing legal
situations differing only with regard to mens rea. 59
This first wave of quantitative scholarship was uncoordinated. In
contrast, a relatively concerted second wave has rolled out for
approximately the past decade, primarily supported by the John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. 60 This second wave has produced
particularly provocative findings with regard to the MPC’s knowing
and reckless mental states, which are defined as follows:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct of the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it
is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result . . . .
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the
actor’s situation. 61

58. Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore
Psychological Reality and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L.J. 1, 21 (2005).
59. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 84–96 (1995).
60. See Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J. Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen
D. Jones & Kenneth W. Simons, Decoding Guilty Minds: How Jurors Attribute Knowledge and
Guilt, 71 VAND. L. REV. 241, 241 n.2 (2018); Matthew R. Ginther, Francis X. Shen, Richard J.
Bonnie, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, René Marois & Kenneth W. Simons, The Language
of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1327 n.τ (2014); Jones et al, supra note 10, at 1 n.†; Frances
X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & René Marois, Sorting Guilty
Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1306 n.ε (2011); Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3227.
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962)
(emphases added).
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A team led by legal scholar Francis Shen (Shen and colleagues)
reported that, for the most part, subjects “accurately sort[ed] culpable
mental states into the four MPC categories” and “punish[ed] consistent
with the hierarchy of severity assumed by the [Code].” 62 Yet subjects
could only correctly identify conduct done knowingly and recklessly
roughly 50 percent and 40 percent of the time, respectively, when
deciding between the four MPC mental states and a “blameless”
category. 63 And for most presentations, “there was no statistically
significant difference between knowing and reckless punishment
ratings. In many instances, subjects actually reversed the MPC
hierarchy and punished reckless behavior more than . . . knowing
ones.” 64
A team led by neuroscientist and attorney Matthew Ginther built
on the work of Shen and colleagues by modifying the language used to
delineate MPC mens rea categories for subjects. 65 This resulted in
improvements in subjects’ ability to accurately identify culpable mental
states in legal scenarios. 66 However, “improvements [were] limited.” 67
Pertinently, only 53 percent and 47 percent of subjects correctly
classified situations involving knowledge and recklessness,
respectively, when choosing between the four MPC mentes reae and a
“blameless” category. 68 And when the two mental states were
misidentified, they were most often confused with one another. 69
Finally, despite improvements in categorization accuracy, there were
no statistically significant differences in subject punishment ratings for
conduct committed knowingly or recklessly, consistent with the
findings of Shen and colleagues. 70
Another team, also led by Ginther (Ginther and colleagues
(2018)), again showed subjects legal scenarios involving MPC mental
states (knowledge, recklessness, and negligence), but crafted the
scenarios such that there was a “best fit” mens rea ascription along with
additional “plausible responses”—i.e., mental states that were not the
62. Shen et al., supra note 60, at 1354.
63. Id. Participants did, however, perform significantly better than chance, which would
have resulted in correct responses only 20 percent of the time.
64. Id.
65. Ginther et al. (2014), supra note 60, at 1339–49.
66. Id. at 1352.
67. Id. at 1359.
68. Id. at 1352; see id. at 1330 (“[S]ubject accuracy in identifying the reckless and knowing
mental states remains far below the classification accuracy for the other mental states.”).
69. Id. at 1352.
70. Id. at 1360.

68

DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[Vol. 71:53

best fit but were plausible given the situation presented. 71 The
researchers reported that subjects correctly identified conduct done
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently 81 percent, 40 percent, and 53
percent of the time, respectively, when deciding among the four MPC
mental states and a “blameless” option. 72 However, both reckless and
negligent scenarios had “multiple plausible responses” involving
different mental states, likely increasing the risk of confusion.73 When
subjects were presented with more descriptive scenario language,
correct recognition of knowledge, recklessness, and negligence
changed to 76 percent, 58 percent, and 63 percent, respectively, when
choosing between the four MPC criteria and a “blameless” category. 74
Given these results, and the fact that many ostensibly inaccurate
identifications entailed plausible responses that were not assessed as
entirely incorrect, the researchers concluded that “subjects appear[ed]
to have grasped the basic conceptual distinctions . . . drawn by the MPC
as . . . modeled” and that “[t]he results . . . indicate that with little or no
training subjects can apply the MPC framework in a manner that is
largely congruent with the basic assumptions of the MPC’s mental state
hierarchy.” 75
Of additional note, Ginther and colleagues (2018) also reported,
based on separate experiments, that subjects generally considered
recklessness both necessary and sufficient for holding others criminally
liable. 76 Moreover, “subjects were strongly inclined to regard
recklessness as . . . sufficient . . . for liability even when . . . instructed
that ‘knowledge’ [was] required under the statute.” 77 These findings
align with those of two other studies. Robert Beattey and Mark
Fondacaro, who are both psychologists and legal scholars, recount that
71. Ginther et al. (2018), supra note 60 at 251–52. The authors provide examples of how
they implement the best fit–plausible responses framework. One involves a fact pattern in which
the uncle of a man named John “pays him one hundred dollars to bring a duffle bag across the
border.” The uncle is known to associate with drug dealers but claims the bag simply contains a
birthday present. John’s sister, who is present, says, “I don’t think that’s a birthday present.” In
response, John’s uncle says, “It’s just coffee,” while winking towards John. “Based on the totality
of the circumstances,” Ginther and colleagues (2018) “think the best fit for these scenarios is
recklessness, but knowledge and even just negligence could also be plausible responses, depending
on a subject’s judgment about the strength of the appropriate inferences.” Id. (emphases added).
72. Id. at 255.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 261. A new scenario was also added in which “[a]ware[ness] of [r]isk” was signaled
to entail knowledge rather than recklessness; this was correctly identified 67 percent of the time.
Id.
75. Id. at 269.
76. Id. at 270–71.
77. Id. at 273.
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across vignettes presented in their study, “more than 60% of
participants erroneously concluded that a purposeful mens rea
requirement had been satisfied when it was not warranted by the
facts.” 78 The percentage of misidentifications increased with the
culpability of the mental state that was actually indicated—i.e., more
subjects elevated recklessness to purpose than elevated negligence to
purpose. 79 Furthermore, the percentage of such errors was correlated
with the amount of harm suffered in a scenario: the more severe the
harm, the higher the likelihood subjects would incorrectly ascribe the
purposeful mental state requisite for criminal liability. 80 In turn, a team
led by psychologist and legal scholar Pam Mueller investigating mental
state attributions in civil contexts as opposed to criminal ones, reports
that “not only do people regard the side effects of knowing acts as
intentional when assigning liability, but they also regard the side effects
of reckless acts as intentional when making liability judgments.” 81 With
regard to awareness of risk, appreciation of “even a mere 3 percent
chance [of injury] was sufficient for 35 percent of participants to say
that” any resulting harm was intentional. 82 Together, these studies
indicate the powerful, befogging influence of moral intuitions on
human assessments of the mental states of others, even when
individuals are exposed to the seemingly clarifying MPC mental state
delineations. 83
The aforementioned empirical psychological-behavioral studies
have expanded knowledge of real-world understandings and
implementations of MPC mental state concepts. 84 They have thereby
contributed to discourse on whether the MPC’s mens rea scheme is
78. Robert A. Beattey & Mark R. Fondacaro, The Misjudgment of Criminal Responsibility,
36 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 457, 466 (2018).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Pam A. Mueller, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, When Does Knowledge Become
Intent? Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859, 875 (2012).
82. Id. at 881.
83. Cf. Paul Egré, Qualitative Judgments, Quantitative Judgments, and Norm-Sensitivity, 33
BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 335, 336 (2010) (“[M]oral considerations influence . . . our qualitative
evaluation of precise numerical probabilities and our qualitative evaluation of precise
quantities.”); Joshua Knobe, Person as Scientist, Person as Moralist, 33 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 315,
315 (2010) (“[P]eople’s judgments about whether a given action truly is morally good or bad
can . . . affect their intuitions about what that action caused and what mental state the agent
had.”).
84. Illuminating non-empirical psychological-behavioral assessments of the MPC’s mens rea
scheme have also been undertaken over the past decade. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive
Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2009); James A. Macleod, Belief
States in Criminal Law, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 497 (2016).
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appropriate in the abstract and in practice. Research indicating that
people have difficulty recognizing the knowing and reckless mental
states and utilizing them to dispense liability and punishment as
intended by the MPC is particularly poignant. 85 Such findings are
alleged to undercut the normative and practical appropriateness of
employing knowledge and recklessness as distinct determinants of
legal culpability and even their existences as separate psychological
experiences. 86 It is these issues that Vilares and colleagues endeavored
to address with their cognitive neuroscience study, 87 an undertaking
Jones and colleagues deem decidedly successful. 88
II. RECENT NEUROLAW RESEARCH AND COMMENTARY
Jones and colleagues profess that a “big problem” with the MPC’s
knowing and reckless mens rea categories “is that no one knows if the
legally assumed and statutorily instantiated distinction . . . reflects an
actual and inherent psychological difference.” 89 If such a variance
exists, Jones and colleagues contend that “there would also be a
difference between the brains of reckless and knowing individuals”
because “anytime there is a psychological difference there must also be
a brain difference.” 90 Hence, if there is no neural contrast, and
therefore “no detectable or meaningful psychological distinction”
between the two mental states, “then widespread injustice will have
followed in the wake of the [MPC], and will continue indefinitely, if
unchecked.” 91 That is, the legitimacy of the MPC’s culpability scheme
is alleged to depend on different neurological functioning
underpinning the cognitive experiences of knowledge and
85. The emergent controversy surrounding knowledge and recklessness is additionally
interesting because the drafters of the MPC believed that they drew “a narrow distinction
between acting purposely and knowingly” relative to the “important discrimination . . . between
acting either purposely or knowingly and acting recklessly.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES, supra note 42, at 233, 236; see Wechsler, supra note 42, at 28, 29 (asserting that
“[t]he discrimination between acting purposely and acting knowingly is, of course, a narrow one,”
and that “[t]here is a broader distinction between acting either purposely or knowingly and acting
recklessly”).
86. See Ginther et al., supra note 60, at 1330, 1337, 1363–64; Shen et al., supra note 60, at
1355–56.
87. See Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3222 (describing the findings of Shen and colleagues
and the need to further investigate the MPC’s knowing and reckless mental states).
88. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 31 (maintaining that the Vilares and colleagues study
provided “empirical support” for the MPC’s knowing and reckless culpable mental state
classifications).
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id.
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recklessness. 92 Vilares and colleagues therefore “designed and
executed a brain-imaging experiment attempting to detect—for the
first time—differences between mental states relevant to criminal law”
(knowledge and recklessness). 93 The experiment also included a
psychological-behavioral component aimed at investigating situational
variables that might influence decision making. 94
The study involved 40 participants: 20 females and 20 males with
an average age of 29. 95 Each trial of the experiment involved a subject
deciding whether to carry a suitcase that might contain “valuable
content”—which Vilares and colleagues and Jones and colleagues refer
to as “contraband” in their respective publications—through a
checkpoint at which the suitcase might be searched by guards. 96 Prior
to making a decision, subjects were sequentially presented with a trial’s
“contraband risk”—i.e., the risk that a subject was carrying
contraband—and “search risk”—i.e., the risk that a subject would be
searched at the checkpoint. 97 Half of the participants were randomly
assigned to always see the contraband risk first while the other half
always saw the search risk first. 98 Participants completed 125 trials
each. 99
Contraband risk was communicated by showing a subject
“between one and five suitcases, only one of which actually contained
contraband.” 100 Accordingly, “the number of briefcases shown
represented the risk of carrying the target suitcase with contraband.” 101
If only one suitcase was presented, then the objective risk of carrying
contraband was 100 percent—this was considered the “knowing
situation.” 102 A “reckless situation” entailed the presentation of more
than one suitcase. 103 The objective contraband risk decreased as the
number of suitcases shown increased.

92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 2.
94. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223–24.
95. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 8 n.12.
96. Id. at 8; Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223.
97. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223.
98. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 11. Each set of 20 participants was made up of ten males
and ten females. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223.
99. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 8.
100. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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In turn, search risk was communicated by showing a subject “ten
tunnel exits . . . , some number of which—either two, four, six, or
eight—showed a guard standing prominently in the exit,” indicating
that the subject’s suitcase would be searched if one of those tunnels was
selected. 104 The objective search risk increased as the number of guards
displayed increased.
Actual numerical risk profiles were never shown to participants in
numeric or word form. Rather, subjects had to “deduce” the various
contraband and search risks with which they were presented from the
images shown. 105
To encourage active and deliberate involvement, participants
started each trial with a certain amount of virtual money ($6000) and
earned more if they successfully carried a suitcase containing
contraband through the checkpoint ($2000), but they lost virtual
money if they were caught carrying contraband ($4000), carried a
suitcase without contraband ($500), chose not to carry a
suitcase ($1500), or failed to make a choice ($2500). 106 At the end of
their participation, subjects received, in real money, “one percent of
the payout from one trial, chosen at random,” which could be “between
$20.00 and $80.00.” 107 Subjects never learned whether a case they
carried was searched or whether such a case contained contraband;
they therefore completed each trial without knowledge of the results
of previous trials. 108
The cognitive-neuroscience component of the study consisted of
all subjects conducting the entirety of their involvement within an
fMRI machine—”[e]ach subject was in the scanner for about 40
minutes.” 109 Scans of participants’ brain function were continuously
obtained throughout their participation. 110 A machine learning
algorithm was trained on a subset of the collected data to try and
recognize and distinguish the neural functioning associated with
subjects’ appraisals of knowing and reckless situations. 111
Subsequently, based on this training, the algorithm was deployed to
analyze additional collected data to try and predict whether a given

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Jones et al., supra note 10, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 11 n.16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–18.

2021 NEUROSCIENCE AND MENS REA CATEGORIES

73

presentation of neural functioning emanated from a subject assessing
a knowing or reckless situation. 112
The results reported by Vilares and colleagues and Jones and
colleagues were produced by the algorithm processing subject brain
states at the time the contraband risk was revealed—for half of the
participants, this was after they had viewed the search risk, for the
other half, this was before. 113 For subjects presented with the search
risk first, the algorithm achieved “an average correct classification rate
(CCR) of 71%”—i.e., it correctly predicted the situation (knowing or
reckless) that a given subject was considering during a given trial based
only on brain images 71 percent of the time. 114 For subjects presented
with the contraband risk first, the algorithm achieved a CCR of 32.1
percent. 115
The psychological-behavioral component of the study involved
assessment of the impacts of risk degrees and the order of presentation
of risk types (contraband and search) on decisions to carry a suitcase.116
Broadly, “as the likelihood of a suitcase containing contraband
increased, decisions to carry the suitcase decreased.” 117 Similarly, “as
the likelihood of being searched increased, decisions to carry the
suitcase decreased.” 118 Moreover, it was shown that “for identical
degrees of [s]earch [r]isk . . . , seeing the search risk before contraband
risk resulted in fewer decisions to carry . . . compared with seeing the
[s]earch [r]isk after the [c]ontraband [r]isk.” 119
Based on the aforementioned results, Jones and colleagues offer
four “immediate legal implications.” 120 First and foremost, they claim
that “by combining fMRI brain-imaging techniques with a machine
learning algorithm [Vilares and colleagues] were able to distinguish
among guilty minds.” 121 With 71 percent accuracy “in some
conditions,” the algorithm is alleged to have correctly discerned
subjects experiencing knowing mental states from those experiencing
reckless mental states. 122 According to Jones and colleagues, this
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3224.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3223–24.
Id. at 3223.
Id.
Id. at 3223–24.
Jones et al., supra note 10, at 21.
Id. at 20.
Id.
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furnishes a “clear” affirmative answer to the question of whether the
MPC’s knowing and reckless mens rea criteria “reflect a detectable
distinction between brain states.” 123 In light of this, they further
contend that the study “suggests that differential liability can
legitimately rest . . . on there being a distinction between knowing and
reckless mental states of the kind that is reflected in distinct neural
activity.” 124
Second, implicating previous psychological-behavioral research
alleged to indicate that subjects have difficulty identifying and
discriminating knowledge and recklessness in others, 125 Jones and
colleagues assert that Vilares and colleagues’ results “support . . . [the]
idea that jurors need more help figuring out how to distinguish
knowing from reckless mental states in real cases.” 126 With the study
allegedly establishing knowledge and recklessness as distinct mental
states worthy of differential legal treatment, 127 Jones and colleagues
maintain that the just execution of the MPC’s culpability scheme
demands that jurors be able to accurately identify others’ physicallydistinct psychological dispositions so that materially dissimilar accused
can be appropriately, and differentially, evaluated. 128
Third, Jones and colleagues hold that the study “suggest[s] the
[MPC] mental state categories may not be nearly as unitary as currently
supposed.” 129 In particular, knowledge and recklessness may be most
distinct “when subjects perceive information about the presence or
absence of an element of a crime after they learn information about
the likelihood of being caught,” and less distinct when risks are
perceived in the reverse order. 130 Moreover, employing these two mens
rea categories is alleged to perhaps be “on shakier ground” in the latter
instance than the former. 131 The authors therefore ponder “whether
policy-makers should consider keeping the knowing versus reckless
bifurcation for some defined circumstances or types of crimes, and
eliminating it for others.” 132

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 21.
Id.
See supra notes 62–86 and accompanying text.
Jones et al., supra note 10, at 22.
See supra notes 120–124 and accompanying text.
Jones et al., supra note 10, at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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Finally, Jones and colleagues broadly state that the “experiment
provides a concrete example of how neuroscientific methods can open
up new avenues for discovering answers to some of the law’s enduring
questions.” 133 However, due to the potentially serious experimentaldesign and conceptual limitations of the target study, Jones and
colleagues’ proffered legal implications appear deficient.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF RECENT NEUROLAW RESEARCH AND
THEIR BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This section presents notable limitations of the study by Vilares
and colleagues that undermine its legal relevance. These limitations
also, therefore, undermine Jones and colleagues’ claims that the
aforementioned study produced legally significant findings and is a
model for how cognitive neuroscience can contribute to the study of
law. First, interpretive limitations are presented: those that do not
appear to seriously challenge Jones and colleagues’ claims but still limit
the explanatory power of the study by Vilares and colleagues. Second,
experimental-design limitations are detailed: those indicating that the
study was not designed or implemented so as to properly elicit or
measure knowledge and recklessness. And third, conceptual
limitations are raised: those implicating the potential for cognitive
neuroscience to reveal or validate the existence of MPC mental states.
A. Interpretive Limitations
At the outset of this evaluative section, it is important to briefly
note interpretive limitations of Vilares and colleagues’ study that
undercut claims that its reported results bear directly on knowledge
and recklessness as delineated in the MPC. These constraints are not
apparently fatal to Jones and colleagues’ broad contention that Vilares
and colleagues contributed to understanding knowledge and
recklessness, but they cabin the significance of any potential
contributions.
First, Vilares and colleagues’ reported results stem from brain
imaging data compiled at the time contraband risk was revealed to
subjects. 134 But the MPC refers to individuals’ psychological
appreciations at the time of offensive conduct. 135 Thus, the
neuroimaging data that likely most accurately correlates with knowing
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3224.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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or reckless mental states, as legally defined, are that recorded when
subjects decided to carry suitcases. Jones and colleagues applying the
knowledge and recklessness labels to mental states that the target study
purportedly elicited therefore appears inaccurate.
Second, recklessness, as articulated in the MPC, entails “a value
judgment, not . . . a fact.” 136 At the moment of an act or omission, an
individual disregards certain risks; these risks are only deemed
“substantial” or “unjustifiable,” and the disregard is only deemed “a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation,” as matters of law after offensive
conduct takes place. 137 Accordingly, an individual cannot be
determined to have been reckless under the MPC until after the fact
by a tribunal. 138 It is therefore questionable whether Vilares and
colleagues stimulated mental states that others would consider
reckless. All that can be confidently claimed is that the researchers
potentially induced less-than-certainty as to the presence of
contraband in suitcases. This further indicates that Jones and
colleagues’ use of the reckless label is incorrect.
Nevertheless, Jones and colleagues’ belief “that the essence of the
distinction between knowing and reckless mental states . . . reflects
different probabilities” appears apt. 139 As a result, discerning whether
different neural functioning attends psychological appreciations of
certainty and less-than-certainty seems relevant to determining
whether such variance corresponds with mental states deemed
knowing and reckless. Given the importance of probability assessment
to knowledge and recklessness, this Essay entertains Jones and
colleagues’ inaccurate designations.
The aforementioned limitations restrain the extent to which
Vilares and colleagues could have contributed to understanding the
MPC’s knowing and reckless culpability criteria, but do not apparently

136. Wechsler, supra note 42, at 30.
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). To
be sure, knowledge can entail a value judgment as well with its call to determine whether it was
“practically certain that [an individual’s] conduct [would] cause . . . a result.” Id. at § 2.02(2)(b)
(emphasis added). But Vilares and colleagues appear to obviate this issue by only referring to
mental states potentially entailing certainty as knowledge. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223.
138. See Packer, supra note 47, at 601–02 (noting that recklessness “require[s] a standard to
be announced for [its] application to specific cases” and that, after conduct involving disregard
for risk, “it remains to articulate a standard for judging when a risk is ‘substantial and
unjustifiable’”).
139. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 29–30.
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prevent them from doing so. The limitations forthcoming, however, are
perhaps more impactful in this regard.
B. Experimental-Design Limitations
Cognitive neuroscience studies are only as good as their predicate
psychological-behavioral components. 140 Target mental states and
behaviors must be properly evoked—in terms of both presence and
discreteness—in order for corresponding neural functioning to be
reliably discerned. That is, “[a] minimal requirement for a welldesigned [cognitive neuroscience] study is that subjects actually
perform [what] the experimenter believes they are performing,” 141 and
the “ability to make judgments about brain maps and their relationship
with psychological processes is limited by how strictly a task . . . tests
the mental process of interest.” 142 The tasks employed by Vilares and
colleagues do not appear properly designed to elicit and isolate the
knowing and reckless mental states or allow for the identification of
the states’ neurological correlates, nor do they seem to accomplish
these aims. 143
It is unclear whether or to what extent participants in the target
study experienced knowing or reckless mental states. Subjects were
presented with what the researchers termed “knowing situations” and
“reckless situations” in which the objective chances of carrying
contraband were 100 percent and less-than-100 percent, respectively.144
But objective risk profiles were never displayed to participants in
numerical or word form and participants were never required to record
their understandings of contraband risk. This implicates the study’s

140. Pertinently, legal scholar Stephen Morse argues that
behavioral neuroscience is largely dependent on psychology. Neuroscientists do not go
on expensive fishing expeditions without knowing what they are hoping to catch.
Instead, they have already identified some psychological or behavioral trait or
condition . . . that interests them . . . . Such identification depends on those behavioral
conditions already being well-characterized and operationalized.
Stephen J. Morse, Is Executive Function the Universal Acid?, 15 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 1, 3–4
(forthcoming 2021); see Roskies, supra note 8, at 71 (“Activation studies with fMRI are truly a
marriage between neuroscience and psychology, drawing as much upon an understanding of
cognition and cognitive approaches as upon knowledge of the brain.”).
141. Id. at 56.
142. Emily Bell & Eric Racine, Enthusiasm for Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) Often Overlooks Its Dependence on Task Selection and Performance, 9 AJOB
NEUROSCIENCE 23, 24 (2009).
143. Cf. Roskies, supra note 8, at 53 (“Selection of the tasks involved in a study is critically
important, strongly affecting its interpretability and outcome.”).
144. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223 (emphases added).
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construct validity—i.e., the degree to which it actually measures what
it aims to measure. 145
Validly decoding the neural correlates of psychological
phenomena via neuroimaging experiments requires that “brain activity
is recorded in circumstances in which there is an independent way to
determine what psychological state the subject is in.” 146 Jones and
colleagues presume that those assessing knowing situations
experienced knowledge with regard to the presence of contraband
based on the number of suitcases presented and behavior allegedly
consistent with such knowledge. 147 Previous psychological-behavioral
research, however, indicates that people have difficulty correctly
identifying and distinguishing knowledge and recklessness in others
and knowing and reckless situations: experiment subjects consistently
misclassified individuals experiencing knowledge and recklessness and
situations
involving
knowledge
and
recklessness;
these
misclassifications often involved subjects confusing knowledge with
recklessness and vice versa. 148 In addition, subject behavior in the
Vilares and colleagues study when presented with knowing situations
was consistent with appreciating high contraband risk, not necessarily
a 100-percent chance of carrying contraband specifically. Finally, while
the computer algorithm semi-reliably discerned neural functioning
corresponding with appraising knowing situations from that
corresponding with appraising reckless situations generally, in certain
circumstances, it did not dependably discern neurological activity
associated with assessing knowing situations from that associated with
assessing reckless situations involving two suitcases—i.e., situations
entailing an objective contraband risk of 50 percent. The computer
algorithm achieved an average correct classification rate of only 55

145. See MADHU VISWANATHAN, MEASUREMENT ERROR AND RESEARCH DESIGN 68
(2005) (“Construct validity is an umbrella term that asks the basic question, Does a measure
measure the construct it aims to measure.”); Drew Westen & Robert Rosenthal, Quantifying
Construct Validity: Two Simple Measures, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 608, 608 (2003)
(“Construct validity is . . . at the heart of any study [that] use[s] a measure as an index of a variable
that is not itself directly observable . . . . [Without] construct validity, results obtained . . . will be
difficult to interpret.”).
146. Gideon Yaffe, Mind-Reading by Brain-Reading and Criminal Responsibility, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 144 (Dennis Patterson & Michael
S. Pardo eds., 2016).
147. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 12. Jones and colleagues note that they “cannot claim that
all subjects actually knew what they clearly should have known,” but nevertheless presume such
knowledge throughout their essay. Id. at 30.
148. See supra notes 62–86 and accompanying text.
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percent in this regard. 149 This near indistinguishability reveals that
subjects consistently inaccurately evaluated knowing situations and
two-suitcase reckless situations. Accordingly, brain images taken from
subjects contemplating knowing and reckless situations do not seem to
represent the neurological underpinnings of knowledge and
recklessness.
Even if Vilares and colleagues reliably elicited knowledge and
recklessness with regard to contraband, they do not appear to have
done so discretely enough to discern corresponding neural activity. 150
Vilares and colleagues implemented a decision-making task:
participants were charged with deciding whether to carry a suitcase
through a checkpoint. While the exercise was divided into three events
(assessing contraband risk, assessing search risk, and making a
decision), at no point was it incumbent on subjects to appraise
individual risk factors outside the confines of the global decisionmaking endeavor. Pertinently, subjects were never compelled to
formulate distinct knowing or reckless mental states with specific
regard to the presence of contraband. Rather, they needed to quickly
assimilate and integrate sequentially presented variables in light of a
previously-declared incentive structure to decide whether to carry a
suitcase. The overarching decision-making task involved a litany of
continuous and intermittent cognitive sub-tasks, which conceivably
polluted one another and prevented discernment of the distinct neural
functioning of any particular mental state or appreciation. Resultantly,
the only cognitive neuroscience findings possible by Vilares and
colleagues appear to relate to neurological activity supporting the
decision-making task generally or buttressing the task at certain
points. 151
This deduction is supported by the fact that the computer
algorithm in question was only able to reliably distinguish the neural
functioning of participants appraising knowing situations in one
circumstance: when contraband risk was displayed after search risk. It
149. Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3224.
150. Typically, “[i]n cognitive neuroscience research, . . . [a]n experimental task is designed
to attempt isolation of the relevant psychological process that is being assessed.” Brown &
Murphy, supra note 8, at 1142 (emphasis added). In turn, “[t]he resulting captured data and
constructed images are interpreted as the neural correlates of that [psychological process].” Id. at
1143.
151. Cf. Bell & Racine, supra note 142, at 23 (“Since fMRI operates under the premise that
measured brain activity is a reflection of areas of the brain engaged in or involved in carrying out
a task, conventional fMRI and the resulting brain images are bound to the context of the task.”);
SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 7, at 22 (“When it comes to interpreting the results of imaging
studies, context is everything.”).
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seems unlikely that viewing contraband risk and search risk in alternate
orders made subjects apprehend the same objective contraband risk
meaningfully differently in terms of harboring knowing or reckless
mental states. It is perhaps more plausible that differing sequences
uniquely influenced overarching decision-making. As evidenced by the
psychological-behavioral data, subjects broadly became less willing to
carry a suitcase when search risk was presented first. 152 This condition
might have enhanced sensitivity to search risk and loss, altered the
weight ascribed to contraband risk, or uniquely influenced the
formation of a decision through some other effect or combination of
effects that produced novel, observable neurological activity. And any
impacts may have been most potent in situations involving high
objective contraband risks since the computer algorithm was able to
semi-reliably discern neural functioning associated with subjects
assessing knowing situations. Moreover, as noted above, the computer
algorithm could not dependably distinguish brain activity correlated
with the appraisal of knowing situations from that correlated with the
appraisal of two-suitcase reckless situations. 153 This additionally
supports the inference that the program did not discern a neuromarker
of knowing mental states, but instead discerned conditional neural
functioning associated with decision-making cognition induced by the
presentation of high objective contraband risk following the
presentation of search risk.
For the aforementioned reasons, Vilares and colleagues’ study
does not appear properly designed to evoke knowledge or recklessness
as to the presence of contraband or to identify specific neural
functioning correlated with these mental states. And the experiment
does not appear to have been successful in either of these pursuits.
Consequently, it seems inaccurate for Jones and colleagues to label
neural functioning correlated with appraising knowing and reckless
situations as representing the physical underpinnings of knowledge and
recklessness. It also seems inaccurate to claim that Vilares and
colleagues distinguished knowing mental states from reckless mental
states in neurological terms or supported the elicitation of knowledge
being substantially impacted by the order in which contraband and
search risk were presented.

152.
153.

Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3223–24.
Id.
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C. Conceptual Limitations
Beyond apparent issues with stimulating and measuring desired
psychological and neurological outputs, Vilares and colleagues—who
predominantly employ cognitive neuroscience methods—do not seem
to have suitably conceived their study to address the existence or
propriety of the MPC’s knowing and reckless culpability criteria. This
is due to the language of the Code, the nature of mental states, and the
current meager psychological-behavioral understanding of knowledge
and recklessness.
The MPC’s mens rea categories are defined in psychologicalbehavioral terms: mental states are the only stipulations. 154 And the
reality of mental states is fundamentally a psychological-behavioral
matter. Only psychological-behavioral manifestations offer base
evidence of a mental state’s existence; neural functioning is trivial in
this regard if untethered to adequately established psychologicalbehavioral reference points. 155 Accordingly, a mental state’s existence
must be established at the psychological-behavioral level before any
legitimate investigation of its physical substrates can be carried out—
i.e., before cognitive neuroscience investigations can provide
interpretable data. 156 If the existence of a mental state is ascertained,
only then can cognitive neuroscience be employed to detect
corresponding neurological activity—non-existent mental states have
no physical underpinnings. 157 And only when corresponding brain
activity is discerned to a reasonable degree—such that specific neural
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962).
155. As put by philosophers Tuomas Pernu and Nadine Elzein,
[i]n assessing . . . neuroscientific data, we are engaged in the project of connecting such
data to psychological and behavioral data. Although we are easily led into thinking that
the former is somehow the more primitive and fundamental of the two[,]. . . it is in fact
on the basis of the psychological and behavioral data that we draw conclusions about
the function of the neural features that are being studied.
Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein, From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap, 11 FRONTIERS
PSYCH. 1, 11 (2020).
156. See Christopher R. Fetsch, The Importance of Task Design and Behavioral Control for
Understanding the Neural Basis of Cognitive Functions, 37 CURRENT OP. NEUROBIOLOGY 16, 16
(2016) (“If we want to understand how neural activity gives rise to our sensations, thoughts,
memories, and decisions, we must come to grips with the fact that everything we know about such
internal processes can only be inferred by observing external behavior.”); see also Yael Niv, On
the Primacy of Behavioral Research for Understanding the Brain, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
IN PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 139 (Adam J. Lerner, Simon Cullen & Sarah-Jane Leslie
eds., 2020) (arguing “that pure behavioral research is not only critical for understanding the
mind—it is also the cornerstone of understanding how cognitive processes are implemented in
the brain”).
157. See Pernu & Elzein, supra note 155, at 12 (“To establish a reliable connection between
behavioral and neural data, we need to rely on clearly defined behavioral variables.”).
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functioning might be accepted as a reliable indicator of a particular
psychological experience—can neurological markers potentially be
employed in place of psychological-behavioral indicators to determine
whether individuals experience a given mental state in certain
circumstances. Thus, in order for cognitive neuroscience to play a
productive part in assessing mental states, including those of the MPC,
their actuality must have already been established by psychologicalbehavioral research. 158
Psychological-behavioral studies can also more directly contribute
to discussions concerning the practical, moral, and legal
appropriateness of the MPC’s culpability classifications. By evaluating
psychological appreciations of circumstances and behavior,
researchers can determine whether mentes reae are stimulated,
recognized in others, or incorporated into accountability assessments
as the MPC presumes. Findings that contradict the MPC’s
presumptions might influence appreciations of the Code and engender
change. Identifying neural functioning correlated with psychological
conditions, on the other hand, contributes nothing on its own to
practical or moral understandings of these conditions or whether they
should be employed in criminal law doctrine. Only once cognitive
neuroscience sufficiently links distinct neurological activity to
particular mental states can brain imaging studies potentially be
employed to investigate when and how such mental states are elicited
and thereby possibly produce data of practical, moral, or legal
importance.
The preceding exposition shows that even if it is the case, as Jones
and colleagues assert, that “anytime there is a psychological difference
there must also be a brain difference,” 159 it does not follow that “the
moral legitimacy of the [MPC]’s taxonomy of culpable mental
states . . . depends on whether those mental states actually correspond
to different brain states in the way the [MPC] categorization
assumes.” 160 If psychological difference is concomitant with
neurological difference, then the MPC’s mens rea taxonomy depends
just as much on the former as the latter. Accepting Jones and
colleagues’ contention means that neurological difference could be

158. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
159. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 5.
160. Id. at 30; cf. Pernu & Elzein, supra note 155, at 11 (“Given that . . . neuropsychological
reasoning, imaging studies in particular, [generally] proceeds” from psychology-behavior to
neural functioning, with the former determining the salience of the latter, “it is very problematic
to start basing our moral and legal judgments on neuroscientific data”).
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inferred from psychological difference. And given that psychologicalbehavioral manifestations, not brain activity, are the sole means of
determining whether mental states exist and are the lynchpins of any
potential contributions from cognitive neuroscience to understanding
psychological phenomena, Jones and colleagues appear to
inappropriately extol neurocentrism when the primacy of
psychological-behavioral research seems apt. 161 Brain imaging data in
accordance with psychological-behavioral data is largely
neuroredundant in terms of the reality or presence of mental states, 162
while brain imaging data in conflict with psychological-behavioral data
should be considered suspect.
For example, suppose psychological-behavioral studies indicate
that individuals experience knowledge as articulated by the MPC. If
Vilares and colleagues are unable to distinguish unique neural
functioning associated with knowledge, this does not challenge the
existence of knowledge, which can only be initially established by
psychological-behavioral manifestations, not neurological activity.
Rather, this implicates the neuroscience technology and methods
employed by Vilares and colleagues or understandings of the
relationship between neural functioning and mental states. In turn, if
knowledge is belied by psychological-behavioral research but Vilares
and colleagues distinguish unique neural functioning associated with
subjects appraising knowing situations, this does not represent
conflicting findings as to the existence of knowledge. Instead, the
cognitive neuroscience results should stoke interest in what mental
activity is correlated with the novel brain functioning recorded.
Moreover, in both of the aforementioned situations, Vilares and
colleagues’ results have no practical, moral, or legal salience because
they merely revealed neural functioning associated with target mental
states and situations—the findings simply provide a translation of
psychology-behavior to neuroscience. 163

161. SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 7, at xix (“‘[N]eurocentrism’ [is] the view that human
experience and behavior can be best explained from the predominant or even exclusive
perspective of the brain. From this popular vantage point, the study of the brain is somehow more
‘scientific’ than the study of human motives, thoughts, feelings, and actions.”).
162. “‘[N]euroredundancy’ denote[s] things we already knew without brain scanning.” Id. at
22.
163. Cf. RUSSELL A. POLDRACK, THE NEW MIND READERS: WHAT NEUROIMAGING CAN
AND CANNOT REVEAL ABOUT OUR THOUGHTS 68 (2018) (“One way to think about brain
decoding [i.e., identifying the neural correlates of cognition and behavior] is that it is trying to
translate between two languages: The natural language of humans, and the biological ‘language’
of thought in the brain.”).
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As it stands, psychological-behavioral studies indicate that people
have trouble correctly identifying and distinguishing knowledge and
recklessness and do not reliably accord punishment in line with the
MPC’s culpability scheme. 164 This potentially calls into question
whether individuals experience knowledge and recklessness as the
Code supposes and, even if so, whether the two mental states are
proper culpability markers. However, it does not appear as though any
empirical psychological-behavioral studies have addressed the base
existence of knowledge or recklessness, 165 and while quantitative
research, like fMRI studies, can help inform determinations of the
propriety of MPC mental states, it cannot resolve such normative
issues. 166
Vilares and colleagues do not appear to address either of the
aforementioned matters (the reality of knowledge and recklessness or
their aptness as signals of criminality). The experiment did not reveal
the existence of knowledge or recklessness because it did not reliably
induce or ascertain subject mental states. 167 By investigating physical
manifestations without determining mental reality, Vilares and
colleagues put the cart before the horse and seemingly descried the
neural functioning of psychological enigmas. The study also
contributes little to assessing the practical, moral, or legal
appropriateness of knowledge and recklessness as indicia of
blameworthiness because it is silent as to their actuality and offers no
insight into how subjects experience or perceive these mental states or
utilize them to dispense accountability.
In light of the foregoing analysis, Jones and colleagues’ claim that
the cognitive neuroscience methods utilized by Vilares and colleagues
empirically identified knowledge and recklessness as actual, distinct
mental states appears dubious. Jones and colleagues’ additional
contentions that Vilares and colleagues’ findings support maintaining
the MPC’s culpability scheme and putting additional focus on ensuring
164.
165.
166.

See supra notes 62–86 and accompanying text.
This suggests a fruitful avenue for future research.
See, e.g., Octavio S. Choi, What Neuroscience Can and Cannot Answer, 45 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 278, 284 (2017) (“[A]lthough neuroscience can inform, it will never be able to
answer ultimate legal questions of culpability and desert. Such determinations are essentially
moral judgments that require understanding behaviors and mental states against the backdrop of
cultural norms.”); Grigori Guitchounts, The Existential Crisis in Neuroscience, NAUTILUS (Jan.
23,
2020), http://nautil.us/issue/81/maps/an-existential-crisis-in-neuroscience
[https://perma.cc/5RRV-LXVY] (“[S]cience gathers facts about the world, but it is humans who
describe it and try to understand it. And these processes require filtering the raw data through a
personal sieve, sculpted by the language and culture of our times.”).
167. See supra notes 140–153 and accompanying text.
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jurors understand and implement this scheme correctly seem similarly
questionable.
CONCLUSION
The MPC’s culpability scheme, encompassing four mental states
that must accompany offensive conduct in order for criminal liability
to attach, is the most influential and pervasive framework for assigning
criminal responsibility. 168 Consequently, the promulgation of equitable
criminal law requires investigating the reality of the mentes reae the
Code delineates and how they are actually experienced, perceived, and
utilized to assess blameworthiness and accord punishment.
Unfortunately, contrary to the assertions of Jones and colleagues,
Vilares and colleagues appear to provide little insight in these regards.
Vilares and colleagues aimed to identify and distinguish neural
functioning correlated with the MPC’s knowing and reckless mental
states in an effort to help determine whether these states actually exist
and their appropriateness as discrete culpability markers. 169 Jones and
colleagues, in turn, deem the aforementioned enterprise successful and
of significant legal importance. 170 However, Vilares and colleagues do
not seem to have adequately designed their study tasks to reliably
stimulate knowledge and recklessness in subjects or, even if they did,
the study does not discern brain activity uniquely associated with these
mental states. 171 Indeed, the researchers appear to have failed to
accomplish either of these aims. 172 More broadly, cognitive
neuroscience is ill-suited to aid in ascertaining the existence of mental
states or, to a certain extent, producing findings practically, morally, or
legally relevant to whether specific mental states should be
determinants of criminal responsibility. 173 Psychological-behavioral
methods, on the other hand, are essential in these regards. 174
Accordingly, Vilares and colleagues trivially contributed to
understandings of knowledge and recklessness and the propriety of the
MPC’s culpability criteria, if they contributed at all. 175 Rather than
“provid[ing] a concrete example of how neuroscientific methods can
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See supra notes 2, 20 and accompanying text.
Vilares et al., supra note 4, at 3222–23.
See supra notes 120–133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–153 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 154–167 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
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contribute information relevant to legal policy,” as Jones and
colleagues advocate, 176 Vilares and colleagues should perhaps serve as
a cautionary illustration of deficient experimental design and the
limited contributions that cognitive neuroscience can make to
understanding and assessing the MPC’s culpable mental states. 177 In
the future, the following should be dutifully appreciated when
cognitive science is brought to bear on the Code’s psychological
delineations: psychological-behavioral research is primary, and it must
be adequately carried out before neuroscience can provide data of any
legal import.

176. Jones et al., supra note 10, at 31.
177. According to Satel and Lilienfeld,
[t]he [primary] job of [cognitive] neuroscience is to elucidate the brain mechanisms
associated with mental phenomena, and when technical prowess is applied to the
questions it can usefully address, the prospects for conceptual breakthroughs and
clinical advances are bountiful. Asking the wrong questions of the brain . . . is at best a
dead end and at worst a misappropriation of the mantle of science.
SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 7, at 152.

